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In this paper we extend the model of Easley and O’Hara (1992) to allow the arrival rates of
informed and uninformed trades to be time-varying and forecastable. We specify a generalized au-
toregressive bivariate process for the arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades and estimate
the model on 16 actively traded stocks on the New York Stock Exchange over 15 years of transac-
tion data. Our results show that uninformed trades are highly persistent. Uninformed order arrivals
clump together, with high uninformed volume days likely to follow high uninformed volume days,
and conversely. This behavior is consistent with the passive characterization of the uninformed
found in the literature. But we do ﬁnd an important difference in how the uninformed behave; they
avoid trading when the informed are forecasted to be present. Informed trades also exhibit complex
patterns, but these patterns are not consistent with the strategic behavior posited in the literature.
The informed do not appear to hide in order ﬂow, but instead they trade persistently.
We also investigate the correlation between the arrival rates of trades and trade composition on
market volatility, liquidity and depth. We ﬁnd that although volatility increases with the forecasted
arrival rates of total trades, it is relatively independent of the forecasted composition of the trade.
We use the opening bid-ask spread as a measure of market liquidity. We ﬁnd that as the number of
trades increases over time, the relative proportion of informed trades decreases and hence, spreads
become narrower and the market becomes more liquid. Finally, we compute the price impact curve
of consecutive buy orders and report the half life of the price impact as a measure of market depth.
We ﬁnd a positive correlation between the half life and total trades indicating that the market is
deeper in presence of more trades.Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Informed and Uninformed Trades
I. Introduction
A fundamental insight of the microstructure literature is that order ﬂow is informative regarding sub-
sequent price movements. This informational role arises because orders arrive from both informed and
uninformed traders, and market observers can infer new information regarding the value of the asset
from the composition and existence of trades. Thus, market parameters such as volume, volatility, mar-
ket depth, and liquidity are all linked in the sense that each is inﬂuenced by the underlying order arrival
processes. In this paper, we propose a dynamic microstructure model of trading, and we investigate
how the dynamics of trades and trade composition interact with the evolution of market liquidity, depth
and price volatility.
There are many reasons why understanding market liquidity, depth and price volatility are impor-
tant. From a practical perspective, the cost of trading in a security is inextricably linked to these market
variables, and market professionals devise trading strategies that explicitly incorporate these factors.
Moreover, the volatility process is important not only for inﬂuencing the risk and return to an investor
in the security, but also for understanding the behavior of derivative securities linked to the asset. From
a more academic perspective, understanding the evolution of liquidity, depth and volatility provides
insight into the price formation process as well as into concepts such as market efﬁciency. We argue
in this paper that understanding these market parameters requires understanding a more basic market
variable, the order arrival process.
To motivate our analysis, a useful construct is to view order arrivals as reﬂecting the behavior of
sheep and wolves. In sequential trade models (for example, Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) and in Kyle
(1985), the uninformed act as sheep, meekly heading to market where they will be preyed upon by the
more informed wolves. The informed traders, the wolves, also head to the market, driven by the need
to feast on the gains from their private information. In simple constructs, the sheep and wolves eschew
strategic considerations and thus move competitively (and mechanistically) to market. Kyle (1985)
introduced the concept of a strategic trader, or a smart wolf, who proﬁts by timing his order arrivals
so as to hide among the sheep. Whether packs of wolves can similarly proﬁt by strategic trading is
1unclear as the equilibrium in Kyle’s model breaks down when the number of informed traders becomes
too large (see Back, Cao, and Willard, 2000). Despite scientiﬁc breakthroughs elsewhere, the sheep in
microstructure models remain quite docile. Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) and Foster and Vishwanathan
(1990) allowed for more introspective sheep who timed their trades to avoid the presence of wolves. In
these models, sheep herd by sending in orders when other sheep are known to be present; the wolves
respond by trading when the sheep trade. A problem in these models is either that multiple equilibria
abound, or that no equilibrium exists at all.
How then do actual traders behave in securities markets? Do uninformed traders meekly head to
market, or are they more sensitive to the dangers of certain trading environments? Are informed traders
strategic in the sense of hiding amongst the uninformed, or do more carnal urges force them to act more
competitively? These are empirical questions, and their answers have important implications for the
resultant price processes in markets.
In this paper, we develop a theoretical and empirical framework for addressing these questions. Our
model is a dynamic extension of the microstructure model of Easley and O’Hara (1992), in which a
competitive market maker sets bid and ask prices based on her forecast of the composition of the traders
(informed versus uninformed) and the probability of good or bad news. In Easley and O’Hara (1992)
the arrival rates of traders are assumed to be constant and iid over time. Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara
(1997a) relaxed these stringent assumptions to allow for greater complexity in the arrival process for
uninformed trades, and in particular allowed uninformed trades to be path dependent within trading
days. LeiandWu(2000)consideramodelinwhichtradesareindependentwithintradingdays, buthave
arrival rates that follow a Markov switching process with history dependent switching probabilities. In
this research, we consider independent arrivals within trading days, but we allow the arrival rates of
informed and uninformed traders to be time-varying and forecastable. In particular, we propose a
generalized autoregressive bivariate vector process for (i) the arrival rates and (ii) the log of the arrival
rates. We estimate both models on 16 actively traded stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange
over 15 years of transactions data. The performance of the two dynamic models is similar, suggesting
that common features of the trade dynamics underlie all stocks investigated.
Our approach is a blending of model-based microstructure with the literature analyzing the econo-
metric determinants of the joint dynamics between trades and prices. Examples of this research include
2Hasbrouck (1991), Dufour and Engle (2000), Engle (2000), Engle and Russell (1998), Manganelli
(2000), and Engle and Lange (2001). In common with that literature, we develop a half-life measure
for market depth that is closely related to Engle and Lange’s VNET measure (deﬁned as the excess
volume of buys and sells associated with a price movement). However, our approaches differ in that
we derive and estimate the trade implications on prices and markets from a dynamic microstructure
model, in contrast to their exogenous dynamic speciﬁcation. Our work is also related to research link-
ing order imbalances to market wide liquidity, see, for example, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam
(2001). These authors relate overall trade imbalances to market returns and to market liquidity. Our
analysis also involves order imbalances, but our model analyzes the richer order ﬂow processes, rather
than the static and exogenous total imbalance. Our model shows why particular components of order
imbalances matter, thus providing an econometric structure for investigating order ﬂow information.
We ﬁnd a number of results on the arrival processes, the most important of which we highlight here.
First, the arrival rates of both informed and uninformed trades are highly persistent. A heavy trading
day is more likely to be followed by another heavy trading day. Furthermore, uninformed traders tend
to follow their own type (herding), and they move to avoid informed traders. Intriguingly, uninformed
traders refrain from entering the market after a day with many informed traders; in effect, the sheep
remain in the barn when the trading climate is inclement. Informed traders, on the other hand, are
not as responsive to the arrival of uninformed traders. These traders exhibit little strategic behavior,
suggesting that information ﬂow is well captured by models of competitive informed trading. This last
result may be particularly important for empirical analyses, as it suggests that informed trade per se
does not introduce complex patterns into either trades or the resultant prices.
Given the forecasted arrival rates, we then investigate the dynamic interactions between the arrival
rates and market volatility, liquidity, and market depth. We ﬁnd that forecasted arrival rates of both
types of trades are positively correlated with intra-day volatility measures. Hence, potentially we could
use forecasted arrival rates to enhance the forecasting of daily volatilities. We also ﬁnd the expected
result that market spreads are increasing in informed arrival rates, and the perhaps not so expected
result that information events appear to be fully revealed by each day’s end. We use Bayesian updating
to calculate a measure of market depth we term the half-life. This measure is deﬁned as the number
of buys needed for the price impact to exceed some pre-speciﬁed maximum. Our analysis reveals a
3number of interesting properties of this market depth measure, with a particular ﬁnding being that it
takes more trades to reveal information in a heavy trading day than in a light trading day (i.e. the market
is deeper in the presence of heavier trading activities).
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the benchmark model of Easley and O’Hara
(1992) and our dynamic extensions. Section III describes the data set and our estimation procedure.
Section IV discusses the implications of our estimates for the arrival processes of informed and unin-
formed trades. Section V describes the implications of our estimates for market volatility, liquidity and
depth. Section VI explores potential applications and future research.
II. Model Formulation
A. The Static Model
We follow Easley and O’Hara (1992) and Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996, 1997a, 1997b) in model-
ing a market in which a competitive market maker trades a risky asset with uninformed and informed
traders. Trade occurs over T discrete trading days and, within each trading day, trade occurs in contin-
uous time. Information events occur between trading days with probability a. When these events occur
they are either bad news, with probability d, or good news with probability, 1¡d. Traders informed
of bad news sell and those informed of good news buy. We assume that orders from these informed
traders follow a Poisson process with daily arrival rate µ. Uninformed traders trade for liquidity rea-
sons. We assume that buy and sell orders from uninformed traders each arrive at the market according
to a Poisson process with daily arrival rate e. A more extensive discussion of this structure can be found
in Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996, 1997a, 1997b).
4On day t, conditional on the parameter vector of the model, Q ´ [µ;e;a;d]>, the probability of
observing B buys and S sells is given by







where yt denotes the observation vector (number of buys and sells) for day t. The probability can be
regarded as a mixture of three Poisson probabilities, weighted by the probability of having a “good
news day” a(1¡d), a “bad news day” ad, and a “no news day” (1¡a).
The model is static in the sense that each day the arrivals of an information event and trades, con-
ditional on information events, are drawn from identical and independent distributions. The likelihood
function can hence be written as a simple product of the above probability density over days. The log















where M ´ min(B;S)+max(B;S)=2, and x ´ e
µ+e 2 [0;1]. Given an information event, x captures the
ratio of the arrival rates of “wrong trades” to that of “right trades.” A trade is “wrong” when it is a
buy in the presence of a bad signal or a sell in the presence of a good signal; a trade is “right” when it
conforms with the information signal. The factoring of xM is done to increase the computing efﬁciency
and reduce truncation error, especially when the numbers of buys and sells are large.
5B. Information Content of Trades
According to this model, data on daily arrivals of buys and sells contain information about the under-
lying parameters of the model. Let TT = S+B denote the total number of trades per day. Then E[TT]
is equal to the sum of the Poisson arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades:
E[TT] = a(1¡d)(e+µ+e)+ad(µ+e+e)+(1¡a)(e+e) = aµ+2e:
Furthermore, the expected value of the trade imbalance K = S¡B is given by:
E[K] = aµ(2d¡1):
Hence, when the probability of bad newsd is not exactly one half, the mean of trade imbalance provides
information on the arrival of informed trades. A more informative quantity is the absolute value of the
trade imbalance. The expectation on absolute differences of Poisson variables takes rather complicated
forms(Katti 1960), but the following approximate relation holds when µ is large:
E[jKj] : = aµ:
These relationships provide a basis for estimating and interpreting the arrival rates of trades. The
absolute trade imbalance jKj contains information on the arrival of informed trades, aµ. In contrast,
the variable (TT ¡jKj) is essentially the balanced trade in the market and contains information on the
arrival of uninformed trades. We incorporate these two trade quantities into our arrival rates forecasting
speciﬁcations.
C. Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Trades
The constant arrival rates in the above model imply that both the number of balanced trades TT ¡jKj
and the trade imbalance jKj should be iid over time. Yet, such a structure seems both rigid and unreal-
istic. A more complete structure would allow for autocorrelation for both series and cross-correlation
between them, in addition to a time trend for each series. To allow for these effects, we specify a dy-
6namicvectorprocessforthearrivalratesofinformedandunformedtraders. Thearrivalrateofinformed
trades is aµ and the arrival rate of the uninformed trades is 2e. Let y = [aµ;2e]
> denote the vector
of the two arrival rates. To remove any deterministic trend on arrival rate of trades, we model the de-
trended arrival rates e yit =yite¡git;i=1;2; as a vector stationary process, where the vector g´[g1;g2]>
captures the growth rates of the two arrival rates.
C.1. A generalized autoregressive speciﬁcation on arrival rates of trades
We propose a bivariate generalized autoregressive forecasting relation on the detrended arrival rates of
informed and uninformed trades:









where e yt denotesthedetrendedtimet forecastofthearrivalratevectorattimet+1, Zt ´[jKtj;TTt ¡jKtj]
>
denote the time-t observables (number of trade imbalance and balanced trades), and e Zit = Zite¡git;i =
1;2. As a ﬁrst order approximation, Et¡1
h
e Zt
i : = e yt¡1, and the speciﬁcation in (3) is analogous to
the GARCH speciﬁcation of Bollerslev (1986) on conditional volatilities. As in GARCH models, the
















Fk+Gk¡1 if k · q
Fk if k > q
;
and xt ´ e Zt ¡Et¡1
h
e Zt
i : = e Zt ¡ e yt¡1 denotes the forecasting error. The stationarity of the process
requires that the eigenvalues of b Fk be less than one. We set p = q = 1 for the model calibration.
Adding back the time trend, we can rewrite the forecasting relation as
yt = wegt +Fyt¡1eg+GZt; (5)
where the products wegt and yt¡1eg are short hands for element by element operations.
7Given the forecasting relation in (5), the log likelihood function has the same form as in (2), with
the constant arrival rates replaced by their respective conditional forecasts. However, equation (5)
forecasts the product of the two parameters aµ while in the likelihood function we need values of the
two parameters separately. To separate them, we assume that a, the probability of an information event,
is constant over time.1
A backward equation analogous to (3) also holds for the same time series:









We use this backward equation to forecast the starting value of y. In particular,
yt = wegt +Fyt+1e¡g+GZt: (6)
Refer to Box and Jenkins (1976), Chapter 6.3, for details. Again, the products wegt and yt+1e¡g both
denote element by element operations.
C.2. A generalized autoregressive speciﬁcation on the logarithm of arrival rates
Since arrival rates only exist in the positive hyperplane, y 2R2+, we propose an alternative forecasting
relation on the logarithm of the arrival rates:













¡1; i = 1;2; (8)
1The growth of trades suggests that both uninformed and informed trades are time varying. Informed trades could vary
because of variation in µ or a, or both. We ﬁnd it more plausible that the arrival rate of informed traders is time varying than
that information events are time varying. However, it is also possible that information events follow a stochastic process that
we miss-identify as variation in informed trades with this assumption.
8where the subscript i denotes the i-th element of the vector. The approximate martingale property
follows readily from the fact that Et¡1[Zt] : = yt¡1. The speciﬁcation is analogous to the EGARCH
model of Nelson (1991) for conditional volatilities.
We again set p = q = 1 for the calibration. Plug in the time trend, we have:
lnyt = w+Fg+(I¡F)gt +Flnyt¡1+GMt: (9)
Again, a backward equation is used to determine the initial value:
lnyt = w¡Fg+(I¡F)gt +Flnyt+1+GEt;
where Et is a backward analogue to Mt: Eit ´ Zit=yi(t+1)¡1.
III. Data and Estimation
We estimate our two models using data from 16 stocks: Ashland (ASH), Exxon Mobil (XOM), Duke
Energy (DUK), Enron (ENE), AOL Time Warner (AOL), Philip Morris (MO), ATT (T), Pﬁzer (PFE),
Southwest Air (LUV), AMR (AMR), Dow Chemical (DOW), CitiGroup (C), JP Morgan Chase (JPM),
Wal Mart (WMT), Home Depot (HD), and General Electric (GE). We chose representative stocks from
a variety of industries which each had high trading volume and were listed on the NYSE. The latter
criterion is intended to avoid differences introduced by different trading platforms. Trade data for these
stocks are taken from the TAQ transactions database for the period January 3rd, 1983, to December
24th, 1998 (3891 business days). A minimum level of trading activity is necessary to extract the
information changes from each day, so we exclude days when there are either no buys or no sells. The
least active stock is Enron, from which we drop 69 inactive days, then Wal Mart (19 days), Exxon
Mobil (18 days), Southwest Air (7 days), Pﬁzer (4 days), ATT (4 days), Philip Morris (3 days), JP
Morgan Chase (2 days), Exxon Mobil (1 day), and Ashland (1 day). Furthermore, the data for AOL
Time Warner, CitiGroup, and Home Depot start late. The starting dates are, respectively, September
16th, 1996, October 29th, 1996, and April 19th, 1984.
9The TAQ data provide a complete listing of quotes, depths, trades, and volume at each point in time
for each traded security. For our analysis, we require the number of buys and sells for each day, but the
TAQ data record only transactions, not who initiated the trade. This classiﬁcation problem has been
dealt with in a number of ways in the literature, with most methods using some variant on the uptick
or downtick property of buys and sells. In this article, we use a technique developed by Lee and Ready
(1991). Those authors propose deﬁning trades above the midpoint of the bid-ask spread to be buys and
trades below the midpoint of the spread to be sells. Trades at the midpoint are classiﬁed depending
upon the price movement of the previous trade. Thus, a midpoint trade will be a sell if the midpoint
moves down from the previous trade (a downtick) and will be a buy if the midpoint moves up. If there
is no price movement then we move back to the prior price movement and use that as our benchmark.
We apply this algorithm to each transaction in our sample to determine the daily numbers of buys and
sells.2
To investigate the interactions between trades and prices, we also download the daily open (O), high
(H), low (L), and close (C) prices from Bloomberg corresponding to the same stocks and time periods.
In particular, we proxy the intra-day volatility by the absolute returns on the open-close (jlnC=Oj) and
high-low (lnH=L).
We begin by analyzing the properties of the trade variables. Table 1 reports the summary statistics
of the trade quantities Z = [jKj;TT ¡jKj], or the imbalanced and balanced trade variables. We observe
the following features:
1. Trades are increasing. The daily number of balanced trades TT ¡jKj in general grows faster
than the trade imbalance K. The estimated annual growth rate for the balanced trade ranges from
2.4% for DOW to 94% for AOL. The growth rate for the trade imbalance ranges from negative
for XOM (¡3:66%) and DOW (¡1:51%) to 133% for AOL.
2. The number of balanced trades is more volatile than trade imbalance. For all stocks investigated,
the standard deviation of the balanced trades is much larger than the standard deviation of the
trade imbalance. Standard deviations are measured on the detrended residuals. Furthermore, the
intercept of the detrending regression is also larger for the number of balanced trades TT ¡jKj
2The ﬁrst trade at each day is excluded from our sample as it is determined by a different mechanism.
10than for the trade imbalance jKj, implying that the number of balanced trades dominates the total
trades.
3. Trades are highly persistent. The number of balanced trades are more persistent than the trade
imbalance. The ﬁrst order autocorrelation for balanced trade ranges from 0.697 to 0.953 while
that for the trade imbalance ranges from 0.145 and 0.772. Autocorrelations are measured on
the detrended residuals. This suggests a complexity to the order arrival process that is not well
captured by static models. It also suggests that informed and uninformed trade behavior may
exhibit interesting complex dynamics, an issue we address in the next section.
4. Balanced trades and trade imbalances are cross-correlated. The two quantities are generally
positively correlated. The cross-correlation coefﬁcient between the balanced trade TT ¡jKj and
the trade imbalance jKj ranges from ¡0:004 for XOM to 0.802 for Citigroup.
We next estimate the parameters of the two dynamic order arrival models in (5) and (9) by maximiz-
ing the log likelihood function in (2). We refer to the GARCH analogue as Model A and the EGARCH
as Model B. The results are summarized in Table II for Model A and in Table III for Model B. The log
likelihoods from the two models are very close to each other, neither consistently dominates the other
across the 16 stocks. Estimates for the two models also imply similar properties for the arrival rates.
IV. The Dynamics of the Arrival Rates
We now turn to analyzing the behavior of the order arrival processes. The structural models derived in
Section II provide a framework for analyzing the potentially complex processes characterizing order
ﬂow. As reported above, the models can be estimated with reasonable precision, allowing us to test the
importance and signiﬁcance of alternative behavioral hypotheses. Our focus here is on the dynamics
of informed and uninformed order ﬂow, and in particular on the factors that inﬂuence the correlation
structures of trades.
11A. Are order ﬂows correlated over time?
The basic structure analyzed in standard microstructure model is of orders arriving in a probabilistic
fashion from informed and uninformed traders. A simple construct of this behavior is to characterize
orders by Poisson arrival processes, where the arrival rates are constant, but may differ across informed
and uninformed traders. The models we derive here allow for much greater complexity in behavior,
and in particular we allow trades to be both auto-correlated and cross-correlated.
The persistence of the arrival rate for uninformed traders is captured by b F22 = F22+G22 for Model
A and F22 for Model B. For informed traders, this persistence is captured by b F11 = F11 +G11 and
F11, respectively for Models A and B. The large, and positive estimates for all of these variables shows
that orders overall are highly auto-correlated, with a high arrival day more likely to be followed by
another high arrival date. This behavior is not unexpected given that many studies have shown volume
to be signiﬁcantly, and positively auto-correlated. But this result is at variance with the predictions of
microstructure models in which trades are viewed as iid. Perhaps more importantly, the result suggests
that trade patterns are predictable across trading days.
We now turn to analyzing the speciﬁc behaviors exhibited by the informed and uninformed traders.
For most stocks, the arrival rate of uninformed trades is much more persistent that that of informed
trades. This suggests that uninformed trade is more likely to exhibit serial patterns across trading days
than is informed trade. Thus, the characterization of uninformed traders as sheep herding together is
consistent with these results. The uninformed do tend to move together, either trading or not trading,
but doing so persistently. Informed trade is also persistent, but the persistence is much lower than it is
for uninformed trade. This is consistent with new information being largely incorporated into security
prices by the end of a trading day.
A natural concern in interpreting these estimates is the stationarity of the underlying processes. As
noted earlier, theoretical models suggest both a wide range of possible equilibrium trading strategies,
as well as the possibility that no equilibrium exists at all. This issue can be addressed by examining
the eigenvalues for Models A and B. For the two processes to be stationary, the two eigenvalues of b F
for Model A and the two eigenvalues of F for Model B need to be less than one. Table IV reports
these eigenvalues for the 16 stocks in our sample. The second eigenvalue is very close to one for




















Figure 1. Arrival Rates of Trades
The arrival rates of uninformed trades (top) and informed trades (bottom) are forecasted over time
based on Model B for Ashland, with parameter estimates in Table III.
most stocks. For three stocks under Model A and two under Model B, the second eigenvalue becomes
slightly greater than one, implying non-stationarity. These results further conﬁrm that the arrival rates
are highly persistent.
Figure 1 shows a typical time series of the forecasted order arrival rates for one stock in our sample,
Ashland Oil. Here the distinctions between the two series are apparent. Uninformed trade dominates
the total order ﬂow, a ﬁnding consistent with the general functioning of liquid markets. The arrival
rates of the uninformed trades not only grow faster over time, but they ﬂuctuate more as well. This
greater volatility suggests that uninformed trade may exhibit complex dependencies, an issue we now
consider.
B. The sheep and the wolf: Do uninformed traders try to avoid informed traders?
From above we know that a high arrival day is likely to be followed by another high arrival day.
But what if the high total trade arrivals reﬂect greater informed trade? Will the uninformed continue
to arrive en mass to the market, or will they be dissuaded from trading by the expected presence of
13informed traders? The impact of previous informed arrival rates on the current uninformed arrival rates
is captured by b F21 for Model A and by F21 for Model B. These variables measure the cross correlation
effects of lagged informed trade on uninformed trade. Thus, a direct test of this avoidance hypothesis
is to examine the sign and signiﬁcance of these variables.
The estimates of b F21 for Model A and of F21 for Model B are remarkably negative for all stocks.
This is evidence of the uninformed systematically avoiding trading when the informed are expected to
be present. This behavior is not predicted by microstructure models, which view the only determinant
of uninformed trading as the presence of other uninformed traders.3 But the strategy seems sensible
nonetheless. Why venture into the trading arena when it is more likely to be populated by wolves? A
better strategy is to simply stay away, and that appears to be what the uninformed tend to do.
The arrival of uninformed traders is also inﬂuenced by the most recent realizations on the number
of balanced trades and trade imbalances. In particular, the impact of the trade imbalance jKj on the
uninformed arrival is captured by G21 ¡G22 in Model A. The results here are mixed. The estimates
for the difference are negative for seven ﬁrms and positive for nine. Hence, the impacts of the trade







and hence is actually time-varying by model design. The time series averages of this impact are very
small and have mixed signs across stocks.
Alternatively, the impact of the total number of trades on the arrival rate of uninformed traders
is captured by G22 under both models. Here the estimates are unambiguously positive for all stocks,
implying that an increase in the total number of trades today forecasts an increase in the arrival of
uninformed traders tomorrow.
3An exception to this characterization is Lei and Wu (2000) who allow uninformed trade to be affected by factors such as
momentum and loss aversion.
14C. The wolf revisited: Do informed traders stalk uninformed traders?
If informed traders are strategic, then their trades should depend upon the order arrivals of the unin-
formed. In particular, Kyle’s model dictates that the informed choose their orders to blend in with
the uninformed, suggesting that there would be strong cross-correlation effects of uninformed trade
on informed trade. Alternatively, if the informed act competitively then their trading strategy is more
mechanistic: trade until the price reaches the new true value, and then stop. This trading strategy
suggests little cross-effects, but would be characterized by strong autocorrelation effects.
We can test for just such behaviors in our model. The impact of previous day’s uninformed order
arrival on today’s informed arrivals is captured by b F12 for Model A and by F12 for Model B. If the
informed act strategically, we would expect these variables to be large and positive. The estimates
reveal a different story. The estimates in both Models are small, and they are not consistently positive
or negative across stocks. This is consistent with the simpler, competitive model of informed trade.
Informed traders act on information, and hence they do not respond to the activity of uninformed
traders.
Informed trades do tend to be affected by overall volume. The impact of the total number of trades
on the arrival rate of informed traders is captured by G12 under both models. The estimates are positive
for all stocks and under both models. Thus, an increase in the total number of trades today forecasts
an increase in the arrival rates of both informed and uninformed trades tomorrow. The impact of the
trade imbalance variable is more problematic. This effect is captured by G11¡G12 under model A. The







which again is time varying and harder to interpret. The time series averages have mixed signs across
stocks.
In summary, we have found that the order arrival processes exhibit a wide range of complex be-
haviors. Uninformed trades tend to be highly persistent, and volatile. Uninformed order arrivals clump
together, with high volume days more likely to follow high volume days, and conversely. This behavior
15is consistent with the sheep characterization found in the literature, but with a signiﬁcant difference:
the uninformed here are smart enough to try to avoid the wolf. The informed also exhibit complex
patterns, but these patterns are not consistent with the strategic behavior posited in the literature. The
informed do not appear to hide in the order ﬂow, but instead trade persistently. There is a smaller au-
tocorrelation effect of informed order arrivals across days, consistent with information being revealed
during the trading day.
V. InteractionsBetweenTradesandMarketVolatility, Liquidity, andDepth
Wenowturn to analyzing the relation between trades and marketparameters such as volatility, liquidity,
and depth. As noted in the Introduction, each of these parameters is linked to trades because the
order arrival process greatly inﬂuences subsequent market behavior. Our model provides a way to
characterize this inter-dependence, as well as a framework for testing speciﬁc hypotheses.
A. Intra-day volatility
To investigate the interaction between trades and price volatility, we construct two intra-day volatility
measures: (1) the absolute return on daily open-close jlnO=Cj, and (2) daily high-low, lnH=L. Our
model provides detrended order arrival forecasts, so we use these predicted estimates to characterize
how the market’s beliefs regarding order arrivals affect price volatility.
A natural starting point is to consider what relation we would expect to ﬁnd between trades and
volatility. A market with high order ﬂow is generally viewed as a deep market, or one in which orders
can be accommodated without large impacts on price. In the same vein, it could be argued that greater
order ﬂow brings greater potential for buyers and sellers to cross, and so again price effects would
be small. These arguments suggest that forecasted high order arrival rates would result in low market
volatility. Alternatively, there are two arguments for suggesting the opposite relation. First, large order
ﬂow may expose market makers to signiﬁcant inventory imbalances. To mitigate this exposure, market
makers may widen spreads or otherwise move prices, which would increase price volatility. Greater
order ﬂow may also signal the presence of new information, and prices would naturally gravitate toward
16new equilibrium levels. Such information-linked effects would also suggest a positive relation between
order arrivals and price volatility.
Table V reports the correlation between the detrended arrival rates forecasts and the two (realized)
intra-day volatility measures. One result is immediately apparent: there is a positive relation between
order arrivals and volatility. This positive relation holds for 15 of the 16 stocks in our sample, and
is robust across both model speciﬁcations. Numerous researchers have shown that there is a positive
empirical relation between volume and volatility. But our results suggest that this relation is actually
deeper, that volatility is positively correlated with the predicted order arrival processes.
If information effects dominate inventory effects, then we would expect this link to be more positive
for information-based order arrivals than it is for uninformed order arrivals. The evidence in Table V
does not support this. While this effect holds true for some stocks, it does not for others. A more direct
test of the link between informed arrivals and volatility is to look at the correlation between the intra-
day volatility measures and the composition of trades. In particular, we deﬁne bt to the the forecasted





Table VI reports these correlations. The signs of the correlations vary across stocks, yielding no clear
prediction. However, the estimated correlations are small in any case, suggesting little link between
trade composition and intra-day price volatility. These results indicate that while volatility increases
with the forecasted arrival rates of total trades, it is relatively independent of the forecasted trade com-
position.
In the same table, we also report the correlation of trade composition forecasts b with the total
number of realized trades TT, as well as the realized proportion of trade imbalance, jKj=TT. The
correlation with TT is negative, implying that the relative proportion of informed trades decreases with
increasing total trades. The correlations with jKj=TT are mostly positive as expected since bt can be
regarded as an approximate forecast of jKj=TT.
17B. Market liquidity and bid-ask spread
Market liquidity is often measured by the bid-ask spread of the security prices with markets in which
the bid-ask spread is small being interpreted as liquid markets. We use our model to derive the bid-ask
spread as a function of the trade sequence and arrival rate forecasts. We then use forecasted arrival rates
to determine how the components of order arrival affect market liquidity.
An application of Bayes rule shows that the probabilities of a good (g) and a bad (b) information








where Prt (g) and Prt (b), denote, respectively, the prior probabilities at time t of a good and a bad
information event. Let V be the expected asset value conditional on good news and V be the expected
value conditional on bad news. LetV¤ ´ (1¡d)V +dV denote the unconditional expected value of the
asset.
In a competitive market, the bid price must provide the market maker a zero expected proﬁt condi-
tional on a trade at the bid; that is, the arrival of a sell order. The bid price is thus the expected value of
the asset conditional on history and on the arrival of a sell order:




¢ dPrt (g)e¡(1¡d)Prt (g)(e+µ)
Prt (b)µ+e
; (11)
where Pr(njsellt) = 1¡Pr(gjsellt)¡Pr(bjsellt) is the probability of no information event.
Analogously, the probabilities of a good and a bad information event conditional on a buy order,
















the unconditional probabilities of good and bad information events are, respectively,
Pr(g) = (1¡d)a; Pr(b) = da:



























and the forecasted proportion of informed arrivals, b. As Table VI illustrates that b is negatively corre-
lated with the total number of trades for most stocks, assuming relative time stability on the signiﬁcance
of the information event (V ¡V), market liquidity increases with increasing trades. When d 6= 1=2, the
impacts are not exactly captured by b, but similar observations apply. Generally, more active markets
are more liquid markets.
C. Market depth and price impacts of consecutive trade orders
When a trader tries to load or unload a large position by putting in consecutive buy or sell orders to the
market, the price change could be signiﬁcant. The price impact of a sequence of trade orders can be
computed by repeated application of equations (10)-(13).
19We take consecutive buy orders as an example. Let PrN¡1
t (g) and PrN¡1
t (b) denote the probabilities
of a good and a bad information event conditional on N ¡1 consecutive buy orders. From (13), we
have that the price impact of N consecutive buys is
askN











t (g) and PrN¡1
t (b) can be readily updated via Bayes rule as in (12), starting
with the unconditional priors at the opening. As the number of consecutive buy orders increases, the
probability of a good information event increases and approaches unity while the probability of a bad
information event approaches zero. The price impact gN
t converges to d and the price converges to the
expected upper bound of the assetV. The speed of convergence governs the depth of the market and is
determined by the arrival rate forecasts (µ;e) on that day.
In Figure 2, we plot a typical price impact curve, gN
t , as a function of the number of consecutive
buy orders, N, based on arrival rates forecasts on Ashland on December 24th, 1998 (the last day of
observation). On that day, the forecasted arrival rate of informed trades is 14.33 and that of uninformed
trades is 148.00. As shown in Figure 2, the price of the asset converges to the high valueV after fewer
than 20 consecutive buys.
Similar curves can be computed for N consecutive sells and for any sequence of buys and sells.
Knowledge of the price impact curve is obviously very important for institutional portfolio managers
in designing strategies of loading or unloading large positions.
Engle and Lange (2001) deﬁne a market depth measure VNET, which is intended to capture the net
order ﬂow associated with a ﬁxed price movement. On each day, given the arrival rate forecasts, we
construct an analogous measure of market depth: the half life (t1=2) of the price impacts for consecutive
buys. Our measure is deﬁned as the number of buys N needed for the price impact gN
t to exceed half of
its maximum (d). Nevertheless, our half life measure and VNET differ in at least two important aspects.
First, VNET is deﬁned on the excess trading volume while we are only concerned with the number of
trades. Trade size does not play a role in our analysis. A second difference is that VNET implicitly
assumes that the sequence of trades does not matter, only the net trade imbalance affects prices. In























Figure 2. Price Impacts of Consecutive Buys
The line depicts the price impact of consecutive buys (gN
t ) for Ashland, based on the arrival rate fore-
casts from Model B on the last day of the data (December 24th, 1998). The parameter estimates of the
model are reported in Table III.
our model, however, the exact sequence of trading history also plays a role in the price movement. We
therefore speciﬁcally deﬁne the half life as a function of consecutive number of buys, not on net order
ﬂows.
Figure 3 depicts two typical times series of our market depth forecasts for Enron on the left and
Pﬁzer on the right, implied by Model B estimates. For both stocks, the market depth measured by half
life has increased in the 90s.
Tables VII reports the mean half life for each stock as well as its correlations with trades and price
volatilities. The half lives implied from the two models differ from each other, but they exhibit similar
overall trends: Stocks such as Pﬁzer and AOL Time Warner have a deeper market than stocks such as
Ashland. Furthermore, the half lives for most stocks are positively correlated with the total number of
trades TT. It takes more trades to reveal information on a heavy trading day, i.e. the market is deeper
in presence of heavier trade activities. On the other hand, the correlation between the half lives and the
ratio of trade imbalance to total trades are mostly negative, implying that the market is deeper when we








































































Figure 3. Time Varying Forecasts of Market Depth
Market depth is measured as the half life (t1=2) of the price impact of consecutive buy orders, deﬁned
as the number of consecutive buys needed for the impact to exceed half of its maximum. The half life
is computed for Enron on the left panel and Pﬁzer on the right panel, based on estimates of Model B,
reported in Table III.
have fewer informed trades. In summary, an increase in total trades increases the market depth while
an increase in informed trades reduces it.
VI. Residual Analysis
One way to investigate the robustness of our speciﬁcation is to check for structure in the residuals of
forecasted order ﬂows. If our speciﬁcation captures the data well, we should ﬁnd minimal structure





; i = 1;2; with Zt = [jKtj;TTt ¡jKtj]:
The expected value on total trades is known analytically: Et¡1[TTt]=aµt¡1+2et¡1. We determine the
expected value of jKj by simulation. The residuals are represented as a percentage of their respective
forecasted value. Table VIII reports the summary statistics for both residuals under Model A and under
Model B. For each stock, the ﬁrst row reports the properties of e1t and the second row reports the
properties of e2t.
22Compared to the summary statistics of Z in Table I, the forecasting residuals exhibit much less
structure. In particular, the serial dependence (the ﬁrst order autocorrelation) is signiﬁcantly smaller,
and in many cases not signiﬁcantly different from zero. The cross correlations between the two residu-
als are also smaller than those between the two elements of the raw data Z.
Nevertheless, one can still discern some remaining structure in the residuals. In particular, both
models seem to induce similar biases on the mean of the forecasting residuals. Both models under-
forecast the absolute trade imbalance but slightly over-forecast the balanced trades.
VII. Conclusion
The dynamic models in this paper identify important forecasting relations in the arrival rates of trades.
While the models have implications for the trading behavior and price impacts of trades, for future
research, more information can be revealed and additional interesting applications can be found by
combining our dynamic quantity models of trades with dynamic models of prices.
As an example, recall that the opening bid-ask spread (OS) each day can be written as a product of
the signiﬁcance of the information event and the composition of arrival rates.
OSt = (V ¡V)bt;
where bt captures the relative proportion of informed arrivals. Thus, given the forecasts of arrival rates,
together with information on the high and low expected values, we can compute the opening bid-ask
spread. Or upon the observation of the opening bid-ask spread, one can infer the high low difference,
which is also a measure of the signiﬁcance of the information event. More signiﬁcant news in either
direction would generate a higher high-low spread. We hence obtain a forecast of the signiﬁcance of
the information event.
In an actively traded market, given the presence of an information event, the signiﬁcance of the
informationeventwillultimatelyberevealedtothemarketattheclose. Incaseofapositiveinformation
event, the transaction price converges to V and in case of a negative information event, it converges to
V. Therefore, the forecasted arrival rates and the opening bid-ask spread together reveal important
23information about the open-close spread. LetV¤ = (1¡d)V +dV be the opening price, then the open-
close spread is (1¡d)(V ¡V) in case of a bad news, d(V ¡V) in case of a good news, and zero in case
of no news.
As the open-close spread can also be regarded as a daily volatility forecast, it is interesting to com-
pare a forecast from trade quantities and opening bid-ask spread with forecasts from the price process,
such as volatility forecasts via GARCH type models. One can further investigate whether incorporat-
ing the information from the trade process increases the forecasting efﬁciency of GARCH type models.
Furthermore, if the derivatives market only prices in GARCH type forecasts, information revealed from
the trade process can potentially be used to design proﬁtable trading strategies. For example, when the
forecasted open-close spread is higher than already priced in the market, one can long a daily put, a
call, or a straddle and delta hedge. All these positions proﬁt from increasing volatilities but are more
or less immune from directional bets.
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26Table I
Summary Statistics of Trading Activities
Entries report the summary statistics of the trade quantities Z = [jKj;V ¡jKj], where jKj = jS¡Bj is the trade
imbalance (difference between number of sells and buys) and TT = S+B is the total number of trades (sells plus
buys) at each day. Under each ticker, the ﬁrst row reports the properties of trade imbalance jKj while the second
row reports the properties of the number of balanced trades TT ¡jKj. The second column (g) reports the growth
rates, estimated from the following regression:
lnZit = a+git +et; i = 1;2:
The third column (a) reports the regression intercept estimate. The fourth column (St Dev) reports the standard
deviation of the regression residual et. The ﬁfth column (Auto) reports the ﬁrst order autocorrelation of the
residual. The last column (r) reports the cross-correlation between the trade imbalance jKj and the number of
balanced trades TT ¡jKj, measured on the detrended residuals.
Ticker g;% a St Dev Auto r
ASH 5.073 0.921 10.190 0.145 0.206
11.495 2.721 37.044 0.809 —
XOM -3.662 3.685 47.322 0.326 -0.004
6.447 5.149 197.227 0.885 —
DUK 3.743 1.551 15.216 0.224 0.183
10.419 3.200 57.442 0.882 —
ENE 11.557 0.870 16.761 0.291 0.326
16.285 2.812 82.516 0.908 —
AOL 133.194 2.896 131.974 0.571 0.683
93.718 5.408 688.675 0.906 —
MO 14.643 2.323 83.095 0.579 0.455
15.132 4.655 340.383 0.899 —
T 6.033 3.369 78.816 0.433 0.132
4.495 5.808 235.872 0.815 —
PFE 13.650 2.170 76.184 0.683 0.625
13.944 4.431 375.726 0.953 —
LUV 17.934 0.360 21.802 0.452 0.416
18.387 2.476 88.850 0.873 —
AMR 5.503 2.071 27.079 0.267 0.369
7.186 4.388 128.836 0.836 —
DOW -1.513 2.928 31.871 0.419 0.125
2.394 5.121 88.271 0.697 —
C 22.445 1.482 76.227 0.772 0.802
24.244 3.341 314.672 0.951 —
JPM 12.619 1.609 33.315 0.473 0.554
13.800 3.778 151.941 0.898 —
WMT 11.009 2.490 58.606 0.514 0.210
15.338 4.057 207.550 0.907 —
HD 21.105 1.387 57.029 0.658 0.533
22.693 3.206 179.999 0.887 —
GE 10.925 2.557 57.672 0.398 0.328
12.771 5.057 452.945 0.947 —
27Table II
Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Model A
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates of Model A:
yt = wegt +Fyt¡1eg+GZt;
where yt ´ [aµt;2et]> denotes time t forecasts of the arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades
at time t +1 and Z ´ [jKj;TT ¡jKj]> denotes the realized trade imbalance and number of balanced
trades at time t. In the parentheses are standard errors. The last row reports the log likelihood value.
Q ASH XOM DUK ENE AOL MO ATT PFE
d 0:5511 0:7743 0:5349 0:4816 0:5371 0:3834 0:5951 0:4482
( 0.0142 ) ( 0.0092 ) ( 0.0127 ) ( 0.0136 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0132 ) ( 0.0111 ) ( 0.0145 )
a 0:4092 0:5266 0:4867 0:4481 0:5203 0:4922 0:4908 0:4074
( 0.0103 ) ( 0.0090 ) ( 0.0099 ) ( 0.0098 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0093 ) ( 0.0087 ) ( 0.0098 )
g1 0:0072 0:0001 0:0471 0:0523 0:0154 0:1445 0:0078 0:1389
( 0.0044 ) ( 0.0043 ) ( 0.0031 ) ( 0.0041 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0078 ) ( 0.0014 )
g2 0:0093 0:0027 0:0491 0:0537 0:1593 0:1424 0:0321 0:1388
( 0.0042 ) ( 0.0040 ) ( 0.0030 ) ( 0.0041 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0013 )
w1 2:1190 2:4286 2:3074 1:9913 3:0877 2:8442 0:8761 2:1160
( 0.0957 ) ( 0.1300 ) ( 0.0956 ) ( 0.0861 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0688 ) ( 0.1187 ) ( 0.0640 )
w2 7:8509 8:1612 7:8323 8:8338 10:1759 9:4953 5:5258 12:4808
( 0.5016 ) ( 0.4496 ) ( 0.4637 ) ( 0.5569 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.1034 ) ( 0.4442 ) ( 0.2546 )
b F11 0:5204 0:6117 0:5046 0:5378 0:4863 0:6387 0:5042 0:5081
( 0.0179 ) ( 0.0040 ) ( 0.0156 ) ( 0.0152 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0032 ) ( 0.0048 )
b F12 0:0348 0:0413 0:0371 0:0329 0:0666 0:0260 0:0595 0:0314
( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0009 )
b F21 ¡1:7298 ¡1:2705 ¡1:6347 ¡2:0162 ¡1:9612 ¡0:9257 ¡1:8897 ¡2:8179
( 0.1279 ) ( 0.0339 ) ( 0.1008 ) ( 0.1351 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0262 ) ( 0.0425 ) ( 0.0909 )
b F22 1:1219 1:1360 1:1193 1:1417 1:2552 1:0549 1:2227 1:1769
( 0.0123 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0101 ) ( 0.0116 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0039 )
G11 0:0768 0:1302 0:0913 0:0719 0:1120 0:1305 0:0926 0:0575
( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0015 )
G12 0:0720 0:0826 0:0718 0:0646 0:0815 0:0997 0:0877 0:0482
( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0012 )
G21 0:3022 0:4449 0:3335 0:3431 0:4376 0:3948 0:3671 0:3698
( 0.0067 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.0057 ) ( 0.0052 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0017 )
G22 0:3316 0:3590 0:3308 0:3574 0:2938 0:4627 0:4253 0:3471
( 0.0035 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0036 ) ( 0.0029 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0009 )
L(£105) 5:9201 64:0319 9:9586 12:5957 31:3832 98:6538 112:6279 74:8664
28Table II (continued)
Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Model A
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates of Model A:
yt = wegt +Fyt¡1eg+GZt;
where yt ´ [aµt;2et]> denotes time t forecasts of the arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades
at time t +1 and Z ´ [jKj;TT ¡jKj]> denotes the realized trade imbalance and number of balanced
trades at time t. In the parentheses are standard errors. The last row reports the log likelihood value.
Q LUV AMR DOW C JPM WMT HD GE
d 0:2998 0:3827 0:5529 0:4275 0:5375 0:5864 0:5600 0:5008
( 0.0138 ) ( 0.0153 ) ( 0.0129 ) ( 0.0143 ) ( 0.0131 ) ( 0.0106 ) ( 0.0156 ) ( 0.0130 )
a 0:4276 0:4707 0:4161 0:4960 0:5191 0:5814 0:3397 0:4342
( 0.0096 ) ( 0.0101 ) ( 0.0096 ) ( 0.0104 ) ( 0.0102 ) ( 0.0090 ) ( 0.0104 ) ( 0.0097 )
g1 0:0682 0:0996 0:0486 0:0809 0:0908 0:0614 0:0759 0:1229
( 0.0035 ) ( 0.0039 ) ( 0.0027 ) ( 0.0042 ) ( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0022 )
g2 0:0701 0:1010 0:0452 0:0848 0:0918 0:0714 0:0790 0:1233
( 0.0034 ) ( 0.0038 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.0041 ) ( 0.0027 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0020 )
w1 2:0010 2:7846 2:2215 2:6584 2:9133 2:8769 2:7226 2:0085
( 0.0718 ) ( 0.1719 ) ( 0.1242 ) ( 0.0897 ) ( 0.0957 ) ( 0.0617 ) ( 0.0929 ) ( 0.0734 )
w2 6:7676 9:4418 10:2262 9:7331 9:4784 6:4879 10:6474 8:9251
( 0.2306 ) ( 0.5416 ) ( 0.4643 ) ( 0.3617 ) ( 0.3080 ) ( 0.0899 ) ( 0.1842 ) ( 0.2661 )
e F11 0:5514 ¡0:3745 0:5461 0:5143 0:3432 0:7717 0:4794 0:5210
( 0.0085 ) ( 0.0267 ) ( 0.0071 ) ( 0.0078 ) ( 0.0086 ) ( 0.0029 ) ( 0.0048 ) ( 0.0040 )
e F12 0:0444 0:2131 0:0366 0:0577 0:0697 0:0210 0:0364 0:0301
( 0.0020 ) ( 0.0069 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0008 )
e F21 ¡1:4905 ¡4:5369 ¡1:7943 ¡1:7880 ¡2:1052 ¡0:4211 ¡2:0071 ¡1:9364
( 0.0594 ) ( 0.1841 ) ( 0.0642 ) ( 0.0694 ) ( 0.0708 ) ( 0.0118 ) ( 0.0778 ) ( 0.0589 )
e F22 1:1461 1:7012 1:1393 1:2133 1:2219 1:0334 1:1371 1:1186
( 0.0068 ) ( 0.0259 ) ( 0.0054 ) ( 0.0070 ) ( 0.0074 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0020 )
G11 0:0960 0:1202 0:0900 0:0630 0:1106 0:1370 0:0801 0:0973
( 0.0026 ) ( 0.0029 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0026 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0023 )
G12 0:0863 0:0980 0:0716 0:0721 0:0982 0:1045 0:0727 0:0680
( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.0016 )
G21 0:3294 0:4634 0:3817 0:2637 0:3840 0:2878 0:3282 0:4300
( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0031 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0030 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0020 )
G22 0:3478 0:4002 0:3806 0:3358 0:3677 0:3886 0:3248 0:3994
( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0008 )
L(£105) 12:9931 29:3080 38:1600 35:0912 30:5118 53:0571 38:1229 115:8519
29Table III
Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Model B
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates of Model B:
lnyt = w+Fg+(I¡F)gt +Flnyt¡1+GMt;
where yt ´ [aµt;2et]> denotes the time t forecasts of the arrival rates of informed and uninformed
trades at timet+1 and Mit ´Zit=yi(t¡1)¡1 is a martingale difference formulated from Z´[jKj;TT ¡
jKj]>. In the parentheses are standard errors. The last row reports the log likelihood value.
Q ASH XOM DUK ENE AOL MO ATT PFE
d 0:5086 0:7037 0:4727 0:7731 0:3955 0:4553 0:5209 0:8315
( 0.0147 ) ( 0.0107 ) ( 0.0127 ) ( 0.0116 ) ( 0.0635 ) ( 0.0149 ) ( 0.0115 ) ( 0.0096 )
a 0:3896 0:6158 0:4880 0:2248 0:2409 0:4919 0:5303 0:1382
( 0.0101 ) ( 0.0087 ) ( 0.0099 ) ( 0.0086 ) ( 0.0267 ) ( 0.0097 ) ( 0.0086 ) ( 0.0070 )
g1 0:0705 0:0831 0:0637 0:1138 0:0943 0:1425 0:0391 0:0821
( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0072 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0010 )
g2 0:1020 0:0829 0:0999 0:1651 0:0637 0:1814 0:0457 0:2244
( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0041 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0082 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0025 )
w1 1:0086 0:4368 0:1463 0:7891 1:6345 0:6154 0:1450 1:3101
( 0.0278 ) ( 0.0131 ) ( 0.0281 ) ( 0.0263 ) ( 0.0649 ) ( 0.0097 ) ( 0.0134 ) ( 0.0327 )
w2 0:5553 0:1691 0:1125 0:7238 0:3766 0:2941 0:1297 0:3011
( 0.0136 ) ( 0.0039 ) ( 0.0181 ) ( 0.0184 ) ( 0.0127 ) ( 0.0049 ) ( 0.0071 ) ( 0.0078 )
F11 0:6718 0:7882 0:5642 0:7637 0:5218 0:6761 0:6031 0:4319
( 0.0106 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0174 ) ( 0.0072 ) ( 0.0035 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0027 )
F12 ¡0:1725 0:0471 0:2095 ¡0:1931 ¡0:0468 0:0710 0:2406 ¡0:1359
( 0.0091 ) ( 0.0029 ) ( 0.0160 ) ( 0.0076 ) ( 0.0047 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0026 )
F21 ¡0:1386 ¡0:0583 ¡0:2693 ¡0:1523 ¡0:0897 ¡0:1594 ¡0:2104 ¡0:1358
( 0.0061 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0183 ) ( 0.0094 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0020 ) ( 0.0014 )
F22 0:8862 1:0040 1:1238 0:8079 0:9797 1:0390 1:1190 0:9730
( 0.0041 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0127 ) ( 0.0038 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0020 ) ( 0.0006 )
G11 0:0784 0:1820 0:0825 0:0227 0:0749 0:0942 0:0812 0:0288
( 0.0030 ) ( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0030 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0084 ) ( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0015 )
G12 0:4527 0:6226 0:3468 0:2495 0:5278 0:7779 0:6126 0:4768
( 0.0091 ) ( 0.0042 ) ( 0.0096 ) ( 0.0122 ) ( 0.0032 ) ( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0029 )
G21 0:0451 0:0585 0:0566 0:0254 0:0194 0:0511 0:0451 0:0092
( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0005 )
G22 0:3325 0:3230 0:2880 0:3503 0:1939 0:4986 0:4308 0:3343
( 0.0032 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0032 ) ( 0.0026 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0007 )
L(£105) 5:9190 64:0295 9:9590 12:5788 31:3359 98:6070 112:6333 74:7764
30Table III (continued)
Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Model B
Entries are maximum likelihood estimates of Model B:
lnyt = w+Fg+(I¡F)gt +Flnyt¡1+GMt;
where yt ´ [aµt;2et]> denotes the time t forecasts of the arrival rates of informed and uninformed
trades at timet+1 and Mit ´Zit=yi(t¡1)¡1 is a martingale difference formulated from Z´[jKj;TT ¡
jKj]>. In the parentheses are standard errors. The last row reports the log likelihood value.
Q LUV AMR DOW C JPM WMT HD GE
d 0:7215 0:2314 0:3422 0:5545 0:3508 0:3596 0:5635 0:3970
( 0.0156 ) ( 0.0129 ) ( 0.0121 ) ( 0.0140 ) ( 0.0136 ) ( 0.0109 ) ( 0.0165 ) ( 0.0132 )
a 0:1618 0:2811 0:4220 0:5225 0:5034 0:5807 0:3002 0:4369
( 0.0079 ) ( 0.0081 ) ( 0.0093 ) ( 0.0074 ) ( 0.0098 ) ( 0.0085 ) ( 0.0101 ) ( 0.0093 )
g1 0:1521 0:0294 0:0208 0:0012 0:1399 0:0707 0:1092 0:1014
( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0006 )
g2 0:1679 0:0130 0:0199 0:1277 0:1829 0:0743 0:1536 0:1379
( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0027 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0029 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0008 )
w1 0:7282 0:0826 0:0673 0:3374 0:1494 0:8912 0:4953 1:0596
( 0.0124 ) ( 0.0258 ) ( 0.0312 ) ( 0.0050 ) ( 0.0128 ) ( 0.0091 ) ( 0.0069 ) ( 0.0100 )
w2 0:3802 0:0689 0:0794 0:2884 0:0966 0:6926 0:3240 0:5735
( 0.0048 ) ( 0.0139 ) ( 0.0158 ) ( 0.0042 ) ( 0.0077 ) ( 0.0074 ) ( 0.0036 ) ( 0.0064 )
F11 0:9184 0:3790 0:5753 1:0698 0:7296 0:6643 0:8860 0:7703
( 0.0029 ) ( 0.0055 ) ( 0.0062 ) ( 0.0029 ) ( 0.0039 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0017 )
F12 ¡0:2519 0:3072 0:2339 ¡0:1306 0:1159 0:0425 ¡0:0654 ¡0:0747
( 0.0038 ) ( 0.0058 ) ( 0.0085 ) ( 0.0032 ) ( 0.0048 ) ( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0015 )
F21 ¡0:0186 ¡0:3331 ¡0:2120 0:0576 ¡0:1614 ¡0:2391 ¡0:0539 ¡0:1131
( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0056 ) ( 0.0049 ) ( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0038 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0014 )
F22 0:8697 1:1600 1:1084 0:8905 1:0673 1:0196 0:9468 0:9533
( 0.0016 ) ( 0.0042 ) ( 0.0050 ) ( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0008 )
G11 0:0525 0:0685 0:0958 0:0758 0:0742 0:1135 0:0556 0:0263
( 0.0026 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0006 )
G12 0:5637 0:4782 0:5315 0:4578 0:5558 0:4699 0:4362 0:5197
( 0.0053 ) ( 0.0033 ) ( 0.0052 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0057 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0054 )
G21 0:0253 0:0419 0:0517 0:0623 0:0475 0:0845 0:0328 0:0160
( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0004 )
G22 0:3235 0:3543 0:3676 0:4123 0:3730 0:4761 0:3145 0:3737
( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0008 )
L(£105) 12:9704 29:3073 38:1629 35:0781 30:5117 53:0567 38:1154 115:8491
31Table IV
Stationarity of the Dynamic Processes in Models A and B
Entries are the eigenvalues of the autocorrelation matrix b F=F+G in Model A and F in Model B. The
eigenvalues should be less than one for the processes to be stationary.
Ticker Model A Model B
ASH 0.6473 0.9950 0.591 0.802
XOM 0.7464 1.0013 0.696 0.613
DUK 0.6281 0.9958 0.513 0.711
ENE 0.6821 0.9974 0.735 0.400
AOL 0.7401 1.0014 0.967 0.333
MO 0.7080 0.9855 0.688 0.595
T 0.7347 0.9921 0.799 0.696
PFE 0.6901 0.9950 0.850 0.732
LUV 0.6996 0.9979 0.967 0.990
AMR 0.3310 0.9957 0.992 0.959
DOW 0.6936 0.9918 0.989 1.004
C 0.7259 1.0018 0.987 1.005
JPM 0.5672 0.9979 0.821 0.971
WMT 0.8115 0.9936 0.986 0.976
HD 0.6209 0.9956 0.997 0.988
GE 0.6437 0.9959 0.983 0.991
32Table V
Correlations Between Arrival Rate Forecasts and Price Volatility
Entries are the correlations between the arrival rates (detrended) of informed and uninformed trades
(e y) and absolute returns on daily open-close (jln(O=C)j) and high-low (ln(H=L)).
Ticker Model A Model B
jln(O=C)j ln(H=L) jln(O=C)j ln(H=L)
ae µ 2e e ae µ 2e e ae µ 2e e ae µ 2e e
ASH 0.0619 0.0225 0.1285 0.0535 0.1244 0.0826 0.2142 0.1586
XOM 0.1604 0.1471 0.2537 0.2329 0.0652 0.1268 0.1423 0.2757
DUK 0.1526 0.1279 0.2439 0.1961 0.1444 0.1284 0.2707 0.2507
ENE 0.0537 0.0355 0.1867 0.1614 0.0377 0.1123 -0.0038 0.2507
AOL 0.0712 0.0811 0.1657 0.1725 0.0649 0.0738 0.1568 0.1477
MO 0.1407 0.1544 0.2577 0.2795 0.1249 0.1137 0.1985 0.2181
T 0.1324 0.1345 0.1970 0.2513 0.1176 0.1252 0.2383 0.2720
PFE 0.1831 0.1998 0.3408 0.3479 0.0433 0.0799 0.0987 0.1893
LUV 0.1133 0.1081 0.2424 0.2220 0.0883 0.0662 0.1608 0.1847
AMR 0.1549 0.1629 0.3067 0.3161 0.1193 0.1596 0.2441 0.3109
DOW 0.1472 0.1678 0.2668 0.2865 0.1238 0.1556 0.2228 0.2560
C 0.1314 0.1255 0.2384 0.2273 0.0943 0.1240 0.1563 0.2336
JPM 0.1490 0.1436 0.2369 0.2268 0.0966 0.0727 0.1376 0.0886
WMT 0.1575 0.1569 0.2712 0.2768 0.1446 0.1594 0.2549 0.2819
HD -0.0003 -0.0368 0.0556 -0.0061 0.0565 0.0109 0.1228 0.0592
GE 0.1849 0.2237 0.3647 0.4132 0.0334 0.2189 0.0989 0.4106
33Table VI
Correlations Between Trade Composition Forecasts and Total Trades, Trade Imbalances, and
Price Volatilities





and the total number of trades (TT), the ratio of trade imbalance to total trades (jKj=TT), and absolute
returns on daily open-close (jlnO=Cj) and high-low (lnH=L).










ASH -0.6555 0.3063 0.0226 0.0685 -0.6225 0.2560 0.0270 0.0535
XOM -0.3327 0.5292 -0.0159 -0.0253 -0.3657 0.4794 -0.0389 -0.0763
DUK -0.7017 0.2982 -0.0663 -0.0823 -0.7541 0.3002 -0.0607 -0.0628
ENE -0.7511 0.3611 -0.0297 -0.1325 -0.7034 0.2938 -0.0599 -0.2027
AOL 0.0527 -0.0410 -0.0159 0.0608 -0.5577 -0.0401 0.0073 0.0136
MO -0.1555 0.2476 -0.0414 -0.0541 -0.3559 0.0929 -0.0723 -0.1430
T 0.1787 0.3190 0.0349 0.0619 -0.2218 0.3811 -0.0375 -0.0718
PFE -0.3987 -0.0006 -0.1537 -0.2317 -0.5366 0.0125 -0.1792 -0.2736
LUV -0.7212 0.2766 -0.0668 -0.1420 -0.4089 0.1771 0.0230 -0.0084
AMR -0.1129 0.0057 -0.0664 -0.1039 -0.4014 0.0326 -0.1382 -0.2597
DOW 0.0663 0.1936 -0.0255 -0.0127 -0.2244 0.2434 -0.0405 -0.0246
C -0.6319 0.2207 -0.0347 -0.0726 -0.6620 0.2104 -0.0634 -0.1293
JPM -0.4126 0.1484 -0.0134 -0.0145 -0.5045 0.1537 -0.0277 -0.0430
WMT -0.5137 0.4569 -0.0172 -0.0405 -0.6896 0.3921 -0.0621 -0.1172
HD -0.6102 0.2517 0.1141 0.1449 -0.6456 0.2604 0.1124 0.1473
GE -0.2605 0.2532 -0.0597 -0.0693 -0.6094 0.1910 -0.1821 -0.2971
34Table VII
Properties of the Half Life of Price Impacts
Entries report the mean half life (t1=2) of price impacts and its correlations with the number of trades
(TT), the ratio of trade imbalance to total trades (jKj=TT) and absolute returns on daily open-close










t (g) and PrN¡1
t (b) are, respectively, the probabilities of the good news and bad news at date
t, conditional on N ¡1 consecutive buys, which is updated via Bayes rule. The half life t1=2 is then
deﬁned as the minimum number of consecutive buys N such that gN
t > d=2.










ASH 3.4242 0.6477 -0.3010 -0.0162 -0.0437 3.3910 0.6720 -0.2472 -0.0020 0.0060
XOM 5.9628 0.3770 -0.4816 0.0139 0.0232 5.1263 0.4831 -0.4263 0.0574 0.1034
DUK 3.4436 0.6562 -0.2650 0.0625 0.0905 3.2431 0.7598 -0.2376 0.0498 0.0745
ENE 3.5372 0.7787 -0.3524 0.0198 0.1197 6.9759 0.7473 -0.3038 0.0560 0.2031
AOL 4.2668 -0.1496 0.0529 0.0129 -0.0779 9.0777 0.7422 -0.0056 0.0666 0.0975
MO 3.7621 0.1476 -0.1987 0.0470 0.0578 4.4108 0.3434 -0.0660 0.0647 0.1302
T 4.8598 -0.1331 -0.2742 -0.0161 -0.0311 4.2812 0.2519 -0.2713 0.0308 0.0771
PFE 4.1724 0.4464 -0.0437 0.1308 0.1909 11.8016 0.7905 -0.0791 0.1979 0.2934
LUV 2.4784 0.7001 -0.2560 0.0503 0.1075 6.0131 0.5481 -0.2741 0.0203 0.0823
AMR 3.0041 0.0147 0.0001 0.0060 -0.0066 6.3631 0.4722 -0.0423 0.1489 0.2724
DOW 4.6692 -0.0154 -0.1406 0.0318 0.0224 3.8990 0.1728 -0.1847 0.0337 0.0197
C 3.1464 0.6713 -0.1675 0.0574 0.1041 4.2188 0.9017 -0.1309 0.1144 0.2111
JPM 3.8781 0.3217 -0.1282 0.0023 -0.0063 3.2632 0.4919 -0.1037 0.0384 0.0694
WMT 3.7766 0.5143 -0.4067 0.0292 0.0512 2.9543 0.7133 -0.3772 0.0769 0.1361
HD 3.8954 0.5473 -0.2489 -0.0909 -0.1262 3.9940 0.6434 -0.2800 -0.0882 -0.1053
GE 5.4387 0.2552 -0.1917 0.0451 0.0598 4.9054 0.7272 -0.2074 0.1716 0.2915
35Table VIII
Residual Analysis
Entries report the sample estimates of mean (Mean), standard deviation (St Dev), ﬁrst order autocorrelation
(Auto), and cross-correlation coefﬁcient (r) of the percentage forecasting residuals of the absolute trade imbal-




; i = 1;2; with Zt = [jKtj;TTt ¡jKtj]:
The expected value on total trades is: Et¡1[TTt] = aµt¡1 +2et¡1. The expected value of jKj is determined by
simulation. For each stock, the ﬁrst row reports the properties of the ﬁrst element and the second row reports that
of the second element of the residual e. The arrival rates are forecasted based on parameters reported in Tables
II and III.
Ticker Model A Model B
Mean St Dev Auto r Mean St Dev Auto r
ASH 0.373 1.159 -0.000 -0.118 0.455 1.253 0.036 -0.113
-0.076 0.371 0.028 — -0.081 0.369 0.010 —
XOM 0.318 1.055 0.189 -0.400 0.130 0.898 0.138 -0.394
-0.031 0.229 0.074 — -0.031 0.229 0.073 —
DUK 0.353 1.165 0.079 -0.296 0.341 1.152 0.080 -0.296
-0.065 0.310 -0.010 — -0.064 0.310 0.014 —
ENE 0.368 1.132 0.043 -0.204 1.986 2.651 0.116 -0.166
-0.063 0.331 0.028 — -0.143 0.306 0.046 —
AOL 0.303 0.971 -0.008 0.278 3.775 3.557 0.067 0.161
-0.015 0.340 0.108 — -0.124 0.321 0.253 —
MO 0.165 0.970 0.134 -0.039 0.247 1.076 0.233 -0.105
-0.029 0.263 0.043 — -0.094 0.251 0.020 —
T 0.342 1.104 0.274 -0.214 0.216 0.984 0.272 -0.211
-0.036 0.228 0.090 — -0.034 0.227 0.055 —
PFE 0.492 1.200 0.177 -0.046 4.519 4.809 0.225 -0.107
-0.038 0.268 0.058 — -0.093 0.261 0.100 —
LUV 0.130 0.948 0.078 -0.053 2.491 3.135 0.032 -0.041
-0.076 0.428 0.069 — -0.184 0.381 0.104 —
AMR -0.022 0.879 0.026 0.053 3.390 3.966 0.067 0.040
-0.030 0.339 0.018 — -0.123 0.307 0.022 —
DOW 0.299 1.092 0.138 -0.113 0.279 1.063 0.120 -0.113
-0.031 0.251 0.051 — -0.027 0.251 0.048 —
C 0.260 0.973 0.098 -0.143 0.752 1.751 0.360 -0.103
-0.053 0.332 0.074 — -0.137 0.311 0.016 —
JPM 0.179 0.947 0.076 -0.115 0.229 0.988 0.116 -0.102
-0.036 0.277 0.065 — -0.030 0.280 0.028 —
WMT 0.191 0.915 0.170 -0.221 0.118 0.881 0.243 -0.203
-0.043 0.292 0.067 — -0.050 0.288 -0.010 —
HD 0.717 1.419 0.262 -0.065 0.844 1.545 0.306 -0.019
-0.064 0.378 0.107 — -0.072 0.373 0.094 —
GE 0.363 1.148 0.105 -0.156 0.284 1.086 0.236 -0.145
-0.021 0.210 0.068 — -0.024 0.210 0.063 —